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The courts should not direct the parties to arbitrate unless the
terms of the contract clearly indicate that the parties intended to waive
their inherent right to resort to the law courts. In an attempt to
defeat the prospect of deception being practiced by various business
groups on unsuspecting parties, the Court of Appeals has reaffirmed
the restrictions set forth in the Level case with respect to an attempted
incorporation of an arbitration requirement.

A
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - EFFECT OF CHANGE OF CUSTODY ON
SUPPORT PROVISIONS OF SEPARATION AGREEMENTS.-Under the terms
of a separation agreement, plaintiff-wife was to have custody of the
children and the defendant was to pay plaintiff the lump sum of $2,500
per month for herself and for the "support, education and mainte-

nance" of the children. When the defendant was awarded custody of
the children in a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding,' he reduced
the monthly payments to the plaintiff by one half. Plaintiff brought
this action to recover the full amount due under the agreement.
Held: The change in custody does not warrant a reduction in the
payments since the separation agreement does not provide for any
such reduction and the plaintiff in no way breached the agreement.
Nichols v. Nichols, 306 N.Y. 490, 119 N.E.2d 351 (1954).
Separation agreements are to be construed according to the basic
rules of contract construction. If the terms of the agreement are unambiguous, the intent of the parties must be found therein. 2 The
courts will not imply or insert conditions which the parties themselves
chose not to insert." Moreover, the courts will not modify one provision and leave the rest of the agreement intact. 4 Accordingly, if
one of the parties breaches the agreement, the aggrieved party's remedy is not reformation. 5 However, adhering t6 the applicable prin1 The children, having refused to make their home with the mother, went
to live with the father. When he refused to return them, the mother instituted
the habeas corpus proceeding to regain their custody.
2 See Brainard v. New York Central R.R., 242 N.Y. 125, 151 N.E. 152
(1926); Hartigan v. Casualty Co. of America, 227 N.Y. 175, 124 N.E. 789
(1919); Matter of Brown, 153 Misc. 282, 274 N.Y. Supp. 924 (Surr. Ct.
1934).
3 Stoddard v. Stoddard, 227 N.Y. 13, 124 N.E. 91 (1919); see Raner v.
Goldberg, 244 N.Y. 438, 155 N.E. 733 (1927).
4 Stoddard v. Stoddard, supra note 3; Johnson v. Johnson, 206 N.Y. 561,
100 N.E. 408 (1912).
5"Such agreements, lawful when made, will be enforced like other agreements unless impeached or challenged for some cause recognized by law. It
is not in the power of either party acting alone and against the will of the
other to destroy or change the agreement." Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N.Y.
296, 300, 26 N.E.2d 265, 267 (1940).
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ciple of contract law, the courts have held that a breach of a material
part of the agreement relieves the innocent party of his obligations
under the agreement. 6 This rule has consistently been applied where
the wife has interfered with the husband's visitation rights 7 and in
cases where the wife violated custody provisions 8 or provisions relating to claims against the husbandY
However, this principle of contract law is seldom, if ever, applied
in cases in which the wife is alleged to have breached the support
provisions of the agreement. Apparently following the maxim that
"[a] separation agreement should be given a strict rather than a broad
construction in so far as it may tend to limit the rights of the wife," 10
the courts have, by a process of narrow construction, practically eliminated breaches in this area. The duties of the wife towards her husband and children have been minimized.1 The courts refuse to look
6 Duryea v. Bliven, 122 N.Y. 567, 25 N.E. 908 (1890); Muth v. Wuest,
76 App. Div. 332, 78 N.Y. Supp. 431 (2d Dep't 1902). However, there is some
authority to the effect that the breach must be malicious. See Benesch v.
Benesch, 106 Misc. 395, 173 N.Y. Supp. 629 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1918). It is to
be noted that the breach of a separation agreement provision differs in some
respects from the breach of a similar provision in a court order or decree of
separation or divorce. One important distinction is that a material breach of
a provision contained in a judicial decree will not necessarily result in the
loss of all rights under the decree, whereas a breach of the same provision in
a separation agreement would result in such a loss. This variation has been
attributed to the contractual nature of the separation agreement. "But that
ruling is based on a doctrine of the law of contracts concerning the mutual
dependency of all promises in a bilateral agreement (see Cole v. Addison, 153
Ore. 688, Note, 105 A.L.R. 901). The essentially different paramount consideration of the welfare of the child governs any case arising, instead, out
of a court judgment or order (Altschuler v. Altsculder, 248 App. Div. 768)."
Almandares v. Almandares, 186 Misc. 667, 673, 60 N.Y.S.2d 164, 170 (N.Y.
Dona. Rel. Ct. 1946).
7 See, e.g., Duryea v. Bliven, supra note 6; Muth v. Wuest, sapra note 6;
Matter of Noel, 173 Misc. 844, 19 N.Y.S.2d 370 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
8 See Haskell v. Haskell, 207 App. Div. 723, 202 N.Y. Supp. 881 (1st Dep't
1924), aff'd inern., 254 N.Y. 569, 173 N.E. 870 (1930) (wife harbored the son
who was supposed to be in the custody of the father for purposes of education).
9 See Schmidt v. Schmidt, 74 Misc. 423, 132 N.Y. Supp. 424 (App. T. 1st
Dep't 1911) (wife instituted divorce proceedings and asked for alimony whereas
the separation agreement stipulated that she was to make "no claim" against
the husband).
10 Matter of Brown, 153 Misc. 282, 284, 274 N.Y. Supp. 924, 930-931 (Surr.
Ct. 1934).
S".. . [N]or will a duty to make specific apportionment [of the support
money] for any purpose be implied in the absence of language requiring it in
the separation agreement. . . . The children have no direct interest in the
money paid to the mother even though it be wholly or partly for their benefit.
. . . The payment belongs entirely to the mother and is given to her for her
own support and to recompense her for the discharge of the duty of caring
for the children. Doubtless she is obliged to provide for them in accordance
with their needs and station in life within the limitations of her monthly allowance . . . but she is not subject to an accounting like a trustee." Yates v.
Yates, 183 Misc. 934, 937, 51 N.Y.S.2d 135, 138-139 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
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upon the wife's failure to support the children, due to circumstances
beyond her control, as a breach of her duty under the support provisions of the agreement.12 The effects of this construction are not
too far reaching in cases involving allocated support payments,' 3 but
are of serious consequence in cases concerning lump sum support
payments.' 4 If the payments are allocated, and the wife's failure to
support the children is covered by the terms of the agreement, there
is no problem-the agreement controls.' 5 If the wife's failure was not
anticipated, and hence not provided for in the agreement, the sums
allocated for the support of the children are paid to the wife as trustee
for the children.' 6 On the other hand, in lump sum cases, where the
agreement does not specifically provide otherwise, the wife continues
to receive the lump sum without a reduction, even though she is no
longer supporting the children.' 7 The end result is that the wife is
permitted to retain, for her own benefit, money formerly given to her
for the support of herself and the children. The courts have based
the ground
their refusal to reduce lump sum support payments upon
that the agreement does not provide for any reduction.' s
12

Under the contract doctrines of failure of consideration and involuntary

breach, the wife's failure to support the children would normally result in her
losing all rights under the agreement. See note 6 supra. But as a practical
matter these rules are not applied in cases involving matters of support. This
results in the paradox of New York courts applying contract principles to
breaches of visitation provisions and not to breaches of support provisions,
when the latter seem to be, if anything, more material than the former.
13 "Allocated support payments" are payments which are specifically apportioned among the wife and children by the terms of the separation agreement.
14 "Lump sum support payments," as used in this article, pertains to unallocated sums paid periodically to the wife, out of which she is to support
both herself and the children.
15 See, e.g., Matter of Herzog, 301 N.Y. 127, 93 N.E.2d 336 (1950) (The
court construed the separation agreement to mean that the sums allocated for
the support of the children were to be paid to the one having actual custody
of the children. When a habeas corpus proceeding resulted in the awarding
of the children to the father, the sums allocated for their support became
payable to him.).
16 "With respect to any benefits intended for the boy [son drafted into
service], her position would be that of a trustee charged with the duty, both
legal and moral, to effect collection so as to make available to the boy the
benefits intended for him." Harwood v. Harwood, 182 Misc. 130, 135, 49
N.Y.S.2d 727, 731 (App. T.), aff'd mnern., 268 App. Div. 974, 52 N.Y.S.2d 573
(1st Dep't 1944).
17 See, e.g., Rehill v. Rehill, 306 N.Y. 126, 116 N.E.2d 281 (1953) (both
children had reached their majority and were no longer living with the mother) ;
Eisenberg v. Eisenberg, 59 N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (son entered the
service). By contrast, had the support payments in the above cases been based
solely upon a court decree, the husband ". . . could have obtained a modification of the order eliminating the requirement to pay for his son's [children's]
support. . . ." Stavis v. Stavis, 61 N.Y.S.2d 634, 635 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
18 See, e.g., Rehill v. Rehill, supra note 17; Hoyt v. Hoyt, 301 N.Y. 589,
93 N.E.2d 492 (1950). The courts are powerless to modify the support payments if the agreement does not provide for such a modification, since that
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In the instant case, the Court followed settled law and refused
to reduce the lump sum payments. Limited to the dispute between
the parties, the decision is just. The plaintiff was ready, willing and
able to perform her part of the agreement.' 9 The defendant prevented
her performance by refusing to return the children. Therefore, he
should not be heard to complain. However, the courts should not
deny reductions in every case simply because the agreement does not
specifically provide for the reductions. The rights of the wife must
be protected, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it
should be presumed that no reduction was intended. Nevertheless,
the courts should look to the entire agreement, and wherever possible,
give effect to reductions which are not specifically spelled out but
which were obviously intended by the parties. 20 One such instance
would be an agreement which provides for a reduction when the children reach their majority. Such a provision logically leads to the
conclusion that the parties intended that a reduction take place when
the wife was no longer supporting the children. Consequently, a
reduction could be granted if the wife failed to support the children,
despite the fact that the children had not yet reached their majority.
By giving the intended effect to this and like provisions, the courts
will be accomplishing practical justice without interfering with the
sanctity of contracts.

TORTS -

FELA WRONGFUL DEATH RECOVERY PRECLUDES
-The
plaintiff-

SUBSEQUENT STATE ACTION AGAINST EMPLOYER.

administratrix recovered damages but no funeral expenses in a prior

action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act' for injuries resulting in the death of her intestate, an employee of the defendant. In
a subsequent wrongful death action 2 for damages and funeral exwould be tantamount to reforming one provision of the agreement while leaving 19the rest of the agreement intact. See note 4 supra.
There was no showing or claim of any unfitness on the part of the wife
to care for the children. The decision and order in the habeas corpus proceeding were based upon a finding that the happiness, welfare and best interests of
the children would be served if their custody, at least for the present, were
awarded to the father. This finding in turn seemed to be based upon the
children's refusal to live with the mother and their manifest preference for
the 20father.
This method was employed with notable success in Matter of Herzog,
301 N.Y. 127, 93 N.E.2d 336 (1950).
'35 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1952) (hereinafter
referred to as FELA). This Act was declared constitutional in Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
2 N.Y. DEc. EsT. LAW §§ 130-134.

